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 Public Support for European Fiscal Integration in Times of Crisis 
 
 
Gianmarco Daniele, Benny Geys 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The current economic crisis has triggered fierce debates among policy-makers and the media 
across and within European countries about the need for a closer European Fiscal Union. Using 
a novel dataset derived from the Eurobarometer surveys, this article investigates European 
citizens’ opinions towards such fiscal integration. We find that both country-level variables 
(such as expected country-level costs/benefits) and individual-level variables (such as distrust 
towards EU institutions, ideology and altruism) have significant explanatory power. We also 
uncover a notable intra-generational divide across young citizens of Euro creditor and Euro 
debtor countries, and show that this reflects their varying expectations regarding the future 
costs and benefits of fiscal integration. This demonstrates that the same demographic groups 
in different countries may have widely varying positions towards fiscal integration. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Following the ‘widening’ of the European Union (EU) via several accession waves, recent 
discussions about the European integration project revolve more around a ‘deepening’ of the 
Union (Hobolt, 2014). This is not only seen in advances of the EU into foreign policy with the 
establishment of the European External Action Service (Murdoch, 2012; Juncos and Pomorska, 
2013; Murdoch and Geys, 2014), but also in proposals towards “substantially reinforced fiscal 
surveillance and policy coordination” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 4, italics added). Two 
recent examples in this direction include the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
– in force since 1 January 2013 and colloquially known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’ (European 
Council, 2012) – and the so-called EU economic governance ‘Sixpack’ – which entered into 
force on 13 December 2011 (European Commission, 2011b). 
 
While a progressive deepening of European fiscal integration thus appears to be taking place, 
little is known about (the determinants of) European citizens’ opinions towards such fiscal 
integration. Nonetheless, elite and public opinions towards European integration need not 
overlap (Hooghe, 2003). Moreover, Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) recently illustrated that (the 
determinants of) support for the EU in general may substantially differ from (the determinants 
of) support for specific policy transfers to the European level. Since broad-based public support 
is essential to legitimize the process of integration across EU Member States, the aim of this 
paper is to evaluate the driving forces behind public opinion towards European fiscal 
integration. This intends to add to our knowledge of public opinion towards the EU in a setting 
where EU policy-making moves into what is arguably a core competence of the nation state 
(i.e. national budgetary policies). 
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 Our empirical analysis predominantly relies on the September 2011 Eurobarometer survey 
(N=26,856 individuals). This wave is unique in including a series of questions about i) closer 
fiscal integration (i.e. national budget consultations at EU level and automatic penalties for 
failing the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact), ii) financial help to Member States in 
economic crisis (which reflects one instance of joint European-level public expenditures), and 
iii) the introduction of Eurobonds (which imply joint EU-level guarantees; European 
Commission, 2011a). Our analysis highlights two central results. First, individual-level 
variables – such as individuals’ altruism, political ideology and distrust towards EU institutions 
– shape opinions about European fiscal integration alongside country-level variables such as 
the expected costs/benefits for one’s country. This suggests that discussions based on country-
level costs/benefits may not sufficiently account for deeply divided public opinion on fiscal 
integration within EU countries (for related findings, see Bechtel et al., 2014; Braun and 
Tausendpfund, 2014; Tosun et al., 2014).  
 
Second, we find that young residents of Euro debtor countries (i.e. GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) are generally less supportive of fiscal integration than older generations, 
whereas the opposite tendency arises in Euro creditor countries. Further analysis shows that 
this intra-generational divide reflects varying expectations regarding the costs and benefits of 
fiscal integration across European regions. This not only demonstrates that the same 
demographic groups may have varying positions towards fiscal integration in different 
countries, but also that younger generations in Euro debtor countries are becoming more 
sceptical towards the EU project. As such countries have traditionally been pro-EU, this may 
have important implications for the future course of European integration.  
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 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
From a theoretical perspective, we build on the vast foregoing literature examining individuals’ 
opinions towards the EU. Some authors have thereby relied on a utilitarian perspective to argue 
that citizens’ perceptions towards European integration are shaped by the expected costs and 
benefits from this process (Hobolt, 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). Other studies rather focus 
on the effect of individual-level attitudes (such as their social identification; e.g. Carey, 2002; 
McLaren, 2004; Chacha, 2013) or, based on the idea that many citizens simply follow the 
guidance of their party of reference, individuals’ political partisanship and ideology (Gabel and 
Scheve, 2007; Stoeckel, 2013). We borrow insights from this literature to derive testable 
hypotheses with respect to European citizens’ opinions towards European fiscal integration. 
 
Utility-based theories consider citizens’ preferences as being shaped by the expected 
costs/benefits of public policies. It thus predicts that (groups of) individuals adversely affected 
by a specific policy will disapprove of it, and vice versa (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda 
and Rodrik, 2005). In our setting, it is important to observe that all steps taken (or proposed) 
towards deeper European fiscal integration aim directly or indirectly at addressing the 
instability of European financial markets. The introduction of Eurobonds (European 
Commission, 2011a), for instance, would have a more direct effect than the Fiscal Compact 
(European Commission 2011b), which foremost aims to foster budgetary discipline through 
stricter fiscal coordination. These measures would thus immediately affect owners of financial 
assets, since it buttresses the security of their investments. This is likely to induce support for 
the introduction of Eurobonds and stricter EU-level fiscal coordination. As owners of financial 
assets are likely to be wealthier, high-income individuals, a slight generalisation of this 
argument suggests that individuals with high income levels would likewise be more supportive 
of European fiscal integration. Bechtel et al. (2014) found mixed evidence for such hypothesis 
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 regarding German citizens’ opinions towards intra-European financial bailouts. This may, 
however, derive from the narrow and specific nature of their sample (i.e., a country that is one 
of the largest net-contributors to the EU budget). We evaluate both hypotheses on a broader 
dataset covering all EU Member States. 
 
H1a. Owners of financial assets are more in favour of European fiscal integration. 
H1b. High-income individuals are more in favour of European fiscal integration. 
 
A reinforced fiscal union is likely to affect different Member States to varying degrees because 
they face different macroeconomic scenarios. From a utilitarian perspective, it is intuitive that 
policy-makers in high-interest countries will be more likely to approve Eurobonds as this will 
create an immediate decrease of their borrowing costs. The reverse expectation holds for 
countries that already pay low interest rates. 1  Consequently, though at the risk of some 
simplification, we might picture policy-makers’ likelihood to approve a deepening European 
fiscal union as dependent upon their country’s public finances. Whether citizens share the 
views of their policy-makers remains an empirical question. Clearly, however, since such 
expectations do not concern individuals as components of a specific socio-economic category, 
but rather as citizens of a specific country, this would be structured as a country-level 
hypothesis.2 
 
H2. Citizens of Euro debtor countries and countries more affected by the crisis are more in 
favour of European fiscal integration.  
  
Similarly, various studies have highlighted the role of a country’s welfare-state typology in 
shaping EU support (e.g. Ray, 2004). The underlying idea is that further European integration 
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 may be alarming to countries with more advanced welfare systems, since citizens of such 
countries fear a dilution of their welfare entitlements through a process of ‘mean-reversion’. 
Since stronger fiscal coordination implies a reduction of national-level fiscal autonomy, 
citizens in advanced welfare states might be particularly hesitant about them. Conversely, 
European integration is expected to be favourably looked upon in countries with relatively less 
developed welfare states, since citizens might expect this to entail social improvements.  
 
H3. Citizens in more advanced welfare states are less in favour of European fiscal integration. 
 
While providing key insights into people’s motivations and actions, utilitarian theory is 
evidently not the only show in town. Social norms, social identification or political ideology 
may likewise play a critical role for individuals’ opinion towards EU fiscal integration. It is, 
for instance, widely accepted that if citizens perceive an institution as corrupt, they will trust it 
less – or not at all. In line with this view, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) shows that citizens are less 
reluctant to delegate more power to the EU if they trust it – and its institutions – relatively more 
than their national institutions. This directly leads to the prediction that perceptions of EU 
institutions likewise shape European fiscal integration approval across European citizens. If 
citizens consider EU institutions as corrupted, they will be less likely to endorse a further 
delegation of power to a European authority.  
 
H4. Corruption perceptions of EU institutions discourage support for European fiscal 
integration. 
 
Moreover, there is a large literature linking political ideology to individuals’ policy preferences. 
The traditional view here is that left-leaning parties (and partisans) are relatively less in favour 
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 of European integration as this process involves some degree of market liberalization (Budge 
et al., 1987). In our specific setting, the left may also oppose increased fiscal integration 
because it threatens domestic welfare programs – and left-leaning parties tend to be more in 
favour of an equitable (inter)national redistribution of welfare (see also Quinn and Toyoda, 
2007; Bechtel et al., 2014). However, right-leaning parties might similarly oppose closer EU-
level fiscal coordination because of their inherently more nationalist orientation. Furthermore, 
since closer EU-level fiscal coordination implies a clear case of government intervention, right-
wing parties – being generally more in favour of market liberalization (Budge et al., 1987) – 
are less likely to support it. Overall, therefore, it may well be those in the ideological centre 
that are most supportive of further European fiscal integration.  
 
H5. Political identification has a non-linear relation to support for European fiscal integration. 
 
Preference heterogeneity within socio-demographic groups 
The theoretical discussion thus far follows previous scholarship by implicitly assuming that, 
regardless of their country of residence, similar citizens have similar preferences towards EU 
integration. However, this assumption may be overly restrictive. One reason why the same 
socio-demographic groups across countries might feel differently about European fiscal 
integration is that the cost and benefits of the current economic crisis – and thereby also of 
measures leading to a closer fiscal union – are distributed differently depending on the country 
of residence. Figure 1 illustrates this point. It represents the share of respondents in Euro debtor 
and Euro creditor countries agreeing that a certain social category has been most severely 
affected by the current financial crisis in their own country (data taken from Eurobarometer 
76.2). Although these perceptions look similar for most groups, there are also clear exceptions: 
i.e. unemployed and young adults are perceived as more strongly affected by respondents in 
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 Euro debtor countries, whereas single parents (and, to a lesser extent, children) are perceived 
as more affected by respondents in Euro creditor countries.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
To the extent that such perceptions reflect real differences in the distribution of the burden of 
the crisis across socio-demographic groups in different EU countries, Figure 1 implies that the 
same socio-demographic groups may have varying evaluations of EU fiscal integration 
measures across countries. Particularly, Figure 1 suggests that young residents in Euro debtor 
countries will be more sensitive to EU-imposed fiscal austerity measures compared to young 
residents in Euro creditor countries. Assuming that older generations do not view a European 
fiscal union differently across countries3, this leads to the proposition that young people in 
Euro debtor countries will be relatively less in favour of further fiscal integration relative to 
those in Euro creditor countries. For the same reason, a similar proposition would arise for the 
unemployed across both sets of countries, while the reverse would be expected for single 
parents. 
 
H6. Young and unemployed individuals as well as single parents differ significantly in their 
opinion towards EU fiscal integration across Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries.  
 
DATA 
Dependent Variables 
The Eurobarometer surveys document the evolution of public opinion across EU Member 
States on a regular basis. Its September 2011 wave is of particular relevance to our analysis. It 
was presented to 26,856 respondents aged 15 and older between 3 and 18 September 2011, and 
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 allows us to define a set of four dependent variables to empirically investigate the hypotheses 
derived above.  
 
Our first dependent variable measures individuals’ opinions concerning Eurobonds. This 
exploits the fact that the introduction of Eurobonds was to be linked to tighter fiscal 
surveillance of, and policy coordination across, Member States (European Commission, 2011a). 
In such framework, Eurobonds effectively become an instrument of European fiscal integration. 
We operationalize this first dependent variable based on the following question: 
“It has been suggested that a share of the public debt of the EU Member States, particularly those 
in the euro zone, should be held jointly. This will allow them to borrow at same rate on the financial 
markets. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree (Totally agree; Tend to agree; Tend 
to disagree; Totally disagree) with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a 
share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly…” 
1- Would reinforce the financial stability of the Member States. 
2- Would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis. 
3- Would penalise those Member States which are not in difficulty. 
4- Would benefit only those Member States which are in the worst difficulties. 
 
Since these four statements tap into different, though closely related, aspects of the Eurobonds 
debate, we generate a composite measure that catches a respondent’s overall approval of 
Eurobonds by adding that person’s responses to questions 1 and 2 to the inverse of his/her 
responses to questions 3 and 4 (since questions 1 and 2 reflect a positive position, while 
questions 3 and 4 reflect a negative position). The resulting variable ranges from a lowest value 
of 4 (reflecting total disapproval) to a highest value of 16 (indicating total approval). To 
evaluate the robustness of our results to this specific operationalisation, we also created two 
separate measures including, respectively, only the positive items related to financial stability 
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 (i.e. items 1 and 2) and the negative items related to the targeted nature of Eurobonds’ 
benefits/costs (items 3 and 4). This alternative operationalisation indicates that our main results 
arise equally for both sub-scales, though they are qualitatively and quantitatively somewhat 
stronger for the ‘positive’ scale (details upon request). 
 
Our next three dependent variables more directly investigate Europeans’ opinions towards 
fiscal integration. Both the Fiscal Compact (European Council, 2012) and the EU economic 
governance ‘Sixpack’ (European Commission, 2011b) include measures that restrict national 
fiscal sovereignty – and thus transfer authority to the EU level. Two such interventions relate 
to the introduction of automatic penalties for countries failing pre-defined budgetary standards, 
and the establishment of European consultations before the approval of national budgets. A 
third measure concerns the so-called European Stability Mechanism, in which all Member 
States contribute to a joint budget that can be employed to provide financial help to Member 
States in financial difficulties (subject to restrictions on national fiscal policies). Questions 
regarding all three issues were included in the September 2011 wave of the Eurobarometer. 
Specifically, the question regarding the former two measures reads:  
“To reinforce European economic governance and help fight the crisis, EU Member States have 
decided that their financial, economic, monetary, budgetary and social policies should be brought 
closer together. Specifically regarding the convergence between the budgetary policies of the EU 
Member States, tell me if you are in favour of or opposed to each of the following measures:” 
i) Including a preliminary consultation between European institutions and national political 
institutions in the drafting process of national budgets. 
ii) Automatic application of escalating financial penalties for EU Member States which fail to 
comply with jointly defined rules on debt and public deficit.  
The exact question regarding the latter measure reads:  
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 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In times of crisis, it is 
desirable for (OUR COUNTRY) to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe 
economic and financial difficulties.” 
In all cases, respondents were asked to provide their opinion on 4-point scale from “Totally 
Opposed” (1) to “Totally in Favour” (4), which is the scale employed in the analysis below. 
 
Before turning to the empirical model, it is important to point out that the question wording in 
all cases tends to be fairly complex. In combination with the absence of a middle category in 
the answers options, this may lead to the measurement of non-attitudes: i.e. respondents 
without knowledge of, or opinions on, the topic(s) at hand feeling forced by the survey format 
to give an answer that suggests the presence of a specific viewpoint.4 To evaluate whether our 
inferences are affected by these limitations in the survey design, we looked into two additional 
survey questions. The first asks respondents: “Have you ever heard of Eurobonds?”, and has 
three answer options: “Yes, and you know what they are”, “Yes, but you don’t really know what 
they are”, and “No”. The former two groups are subsequently asked to provide their opinion 
on a 4-point scale from “Totally Opposed” (1) to “Totally in Favour” (4) on the question: 
“Would you say that you are in favour of, or opposed to, the creation of Eurobonds, on the 
basis of what you know about them?”. This set of questions not only allows assessing the 
robustness of our results with respect to the Eurobonds question presented above, but 
furthermore provides the opportunity to compare the results from two mutually exclusive 
subsamples of the respondent population: i.e. respondents with and without detailed knowledge 
of Eurobonds (N≈2000 in both cases). The former subsample is least affected by possible non-
attitude measurement, such that it can provide robust evidence regarding the validity of the 
findings in the main analysis. 
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Methodology and empirical model 
Our analysis builds on a multilevel empirical approach. This has two justifications. First, our 
data are hierarchically organized in two levels – i.e. individuals (level 1) in countries (level 2). 
Second, our hypotheses concern effects that play out at both the individual- and country-level, 
requiring us to explicitly model the variation at both levels (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The 
specification of the individual-level equation is: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
Where Yij is the set of dependent variables discussed above for individual i in country j. Note 
that the intercept (β0j) has a subscript j, indicating that each country has its own intercept that 
we model in more detail below. To assess hypotheses H1a,b, we include two measures 
evaluating the importance of individual-level utilitarian means-end reasoning: i.e. INCij is a 
self-placement item where individuals rank themselves on a ten-point scale from the top to the 
bottom decile in the country’s income distribution, while ASSETSij is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for respondents owning bonds or shares. We expect β1>0 and β2>0. Then, we add a 
variables tapping into respondents’ trust in the EU institutions. EU CORRUPTij equals 1 for 
those disagreeing to the following statement: “There is corruption within the institutions of the 
EU”. As corruption perceptions will undermine trust in the EU, and thereby support for 
European fiscal integration (see H4), we expect β3>0.5 Finally, IDEOij builds on the question: 
“In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views 
on this scale?”. The scale goes from 1 (left) to 10 (right). In light of hypothesis H5, we also 
include the squared value of IDEOij and expect a non-linear relation with preferences towards 
European fiscal integration. 
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Our set of control variables at the individual level first of all includes socio-demographic 
variables. AGEij is an indicator variable equal to 1 for respondents under 30 years, 0 otherwise.6 
MALEij, MARRIEDij and UNEMPij are self-explanatory dummy variables. EDUij reflects the 
respondent’s number of years of education in four categories (i.e. less than 14 years, 16-19 
years, more than 20 years and ‘ongoing’), and we include indicator variables for all but the first 
category in the estimation model. As an individuals’ general inclination towards costly, pro-
social behavior irrespective of in-group/out-group considerations might affect opinions 
towards intra-European financial support (Bechtel et al., 2014), we include a measure 
ALTRUISMij equal to 1 for respondents replying positively to: “Would you be prepared to pay 
more for groceries or other products from developing countries to support people living in 
these countries (for instance for fair-trade products)?”. Note that by not referring to the 
European context, we believe this question is more likely to reflect a general sense of altruism 
towards the less well-off, and will not be contaminated by respondents’ potential feelings 
towards fiscally distressed EU countries. Finally, since people’s evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of enhanced fiscal integration is likely to be driven by their perception of the need for 
such measures, we control for their expectations about the future development of the European 
(and global) economy. OPTIMISTij is a variable that catches expectations about the end of the 
crisis in a four-point scale, where 1 stands for the most pessimist and 4 is the most optimist. 
Specifically, respondents can choose between: We are already returning to growth (4); A 
return to growth will start in the coming months (3); A return to growth will start in the coming 
years (2); The crisis is going to last for many years (1).7 
 
Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to include direct measures of individuals’ 
national and/or European identification (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2004; Chacha, 2013; Kuhn 
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 and Stoeckel, 2014). Still, in a series of auxiliary regressions, we experimented with a proxy 
set equal to 1 if a respondent feels his/her country is not corrupt while the EU is and -1 when a 
respondent feels his/her country is corrupt while the EU is not (0 otherwise). This proxy is 
based on the idea that people identifying with a certain social group tend to display more 
positive dispositions towards this group compared to an out-group (i.e. in-group/out-group 
opposition known from social identity theory and social categorization theory; Turner, 1975; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Given the indirect nature of this variable and the fact that its inclusion 
leaves all main effects unaffected, we do not include it in our analysis below (details available 
upon request) and refer the interested reader to recent studies by Chacha (2013) and Kuhn and 
Stoeckel (2014) for a more in-depth treatment of the potential role of (supra)national 
identification. 
 
The specification of the country-level model is: 
 
𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾00 + +𝛾𝛾01𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾02𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾03𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾04𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾05𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖 
 
Where total national public debt (DEBTj), deficit (DEFICITj) and expenditures on social 
protection (SOCEXPj) are measured as a share of GDP and obtained from Eurostat. GIIPSj is 
an indicator variable for respondents in Euro debtor countries (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). Referring back to hypothesis H2, we expect γ01-γ03>0, while hypothesis 
H3 suggests that γ04<0. We also control the average support at the national level for the 
European Union (TRUSTEUj), which is calculated from the most recent European Value 
Survey (2008).8 For reasons of space, detailed summary statistics for all relevant variables are 
available on the first authors’ website.  
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 RESULTS 
Baseline estimation results 
We use Stata13 to estimate our multilevel model with the maximum-likelihood method. The 
main results are reported in Table 1, where each column focuses on one of our four central 
dependent variables. The final two columns use the alternative measure of Eurobond approval 
presented above, and are constrained to subsamples of respondents with (Column (5)) and 
without (Column (6)) detailed knowledge of Eurobonds. As mentioned, this is critical to assess 
any bias in our findings due to non-attitude measurement. It is also important to note that we 
estimate a linear multilevel model in column (1), whereas columns (2) to (6) present results 
from multilevel ordered logit models to accommodate the four-category answer scales for the 
remaining dependent variables.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Looking first at the variables addressing the self-interest hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H2 and H3), 
we find some evidence for the proposition that owners of financial assets (H1a) and individuals 
with higher incomes (H1b) are more likely to support European fiscal integration (H1a). 
Specifically, they are more supportive of financial help to other Member States during financial 
crises and of the authority transfers linked to fiscal coordination within the EU (as reflected in 
EU-level consultation on national budgets and automatic penalties for breaching European debt 
and deficit regulations). This is at odds with Kuhn and Stoeckel’s (2014) finding that 
individual-level cost-benefit calculations do not affect preferences towards European economic 
governance. One potential explanation might be that ‘economic governance’ suggests active 
EU-level involvement, whereas our measures of fiscal authority transfers imply some degree 
of automaticity (e.g., ‘automatic penalties’). The latter might thus be perceived as less 
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 influenced by (short-term) political motives, which is likely to be beneficial when it comes to 
individual-level cost-benefit calculations. Clearly, however, this tentative explanation would 
require further substantiation.  
 
Interestingly, neither high-income individuals, nor owners of financial assets stand out as more 
supportive of Eurobonds’ introduction – a finding that mirrors recent evidence on opinions 
regarding European bailout measures among German respondents (Bechtel et al., 2014). One 
explanation might be that Eurobonds (and direct bailout measures more generally) could induce 
moral hazard problems, and thereby encourage prolonged (or excessive) instability of 
European financial markets. As this would be particularly harmful for high-income owners of 
financial assets, it might counteract their inherent supportive attitude towards a closer fiscal 
union. 
 
Our two country-level self-interest hypotheses (H2 and H3) receive mixed support.9 Starting 
with H3, we find that citizens in countries with higher levels of social expenditures (SOCEXPj) 
are significantly less likely to support Eurobonds. This is in line with H3, and suggests that 
further European fiscal integration may be linked to fears of a dilution of existing welfare 
entitlements through a process of ‘mean-reversion’. Respondents in countries with a higher 
level of social expenditures are, however, significantly more likely to support automatic 
penalties for fiscal irresponsibility, as well as financial help to Member States in financial 
difficulties. While this is at odds with H3, the former may be driven by the fact that automatic 
penalties are arguably the least invasive way of imposing fiscal discipline. Indeed, whereas 
enforced EU-level budget consultations may directly impact the level and composition of 
public spending, this is not the case for automatic penalties – which could make them more 
appealing to citizens in countries fearing mean-reversion in welfare entitlements from more 
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 direct forms of EU fiscal integration. The latter effect most likely relates to the fact that 
extensive welfare state provisions at least partly reflect the more altruistic preferences of 
inhabitants of such countries.  
 
With respect to H2, our results suggest that respondents in countries with higher levels of public 
debt as well as residents of Euro debtor countries tend to be more supportive of Eurobonds and 
financial bailouts (in line with H2). Similarly, respondents in Euro debtor countries and 
countries with higher deficits are less supportive of EU-level consultations of the national 
budgets. Taken together, the general tenor of these findings could reflect a (natural?) tendency 
to desire the availability of bailout funds without restrictions on national sovereignty. While 
not fully reflective of our initial hypothesis H2, these findings do indicate that the current 
borrowing costs of one’s country bear not only on politicians’, but also on citizens’, opinions 
towards European fiscal integration.  
 
Our remaining hypotheses are related to the role of individuals’ EU-level corruption 
perceptions and political ideology (H4 and H5). Here, we cannot reject the proposition that 
citizens’ opinions on fiscal integration are shaped by underlying beliefs in the EU’s integrity 
(H4; see also Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). The coefficient estimate (EU CORRUPTij) is positive 
and statistically significant in three of four models. Note that these results arise despite the fact 
that we control for trust in the EU at the country-level (TRUSTEUj), which shows a consistent 
positive relation to individual-level opinions towards European fiscal integration (though 
statistical significance at conventional levels is reached in only two of four estimations). Finally, 
our results suggest that individuals’ political leaning plays an interesting role (H5). Specifically, 
we find that individuals towards the extremes of the political spectrum are significantly more 
likely to approve Eurobonds, while respondents on the left are somewhat more likely to 
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 approve financial help to other Member States. This is closely in line with the customary 
economic policy preferences of left- versus right-wing parties (Budge et al., 1987; Quinn and 
Toyoda, 2007; Bechtel et al., 2014). 
 
Preference heterogeneity within socio-demographic groups across countries 
Thus far, the slopes of the regression lines representing individual-level characteristics have 
been kept constant across countries. Hypothesis H6, however, suggests that this might be 
inappropriate where it concerns young and unemployed individuals, as well as single parents. 
In Table 2, we therefore treat the variables AGEij and UNEMPij as random terms and extend 
our estimation model with a cross-level interaction between GIIPSij and the variables AGEij 
and UNEMPij. The results are reported in the same format as Table 1.10 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 illustrates that, while leaving our previous findings unaffected, the interaction term 
between UNEMPij and GIIPSij never reaches statistical significance. Hence, there appears to 
be no significant difference between unemployed individuals in Euro debtor and Euro creditor 
countries when it comes to their opinions towards European fiscal integration. In contrast, the 
interaction between GIIPSij and AGEij is statistically significant at conventional levels in three 
of four models. In those models (i.e. Eurobonds, Automatic Penalties and Financial Help), its 
coefficient estimate is also substantially larger (in absolute terms) than the non-interacted 
coefficient of AGEij. This suggests the presence of an important intra-generational divide across 
young citizens of Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries: i.e. young generations in Euro debtor 
countries are relatively less in favour of European fiscal integration compared to adults, while 
the reverse holds in Euro creditor countries. Importantly, when comparing Columns (5) and (6) 
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 in Table 2 this effect appears substantially and statistically stronger among the subsample with 
detailed knowledge of Eurobonds, suggesting that this finding is not driven by non-attitude 
measurement.  
 
We should also point out that young generations in Euro debtor countries are relatively more 
in favour automatic penalties. While this initially appears peculiar, a potential explanation 
might again reside in the fact that automatic penalties are the least invasive way of imposing 
some degree of fiscal discipline. Young generations in Euro debtor countries may prefer this 
route, because it leaves substantial autonomy with respect to the level and composition of 
public spending. Overall, however, our findings not only demonstrate that the same 
demographic groups may have varying positions towards fiscal unification in different 
countries, but also that younger generations in Euro debtor countries are becoming more 
sceptical towards the EU project. As citizens of Euro debtor countries have traditionally been 
pro-EU, this may have important implications for the future of European integration. 
 
Finally, does this variation in younger individuals’ opinions across countries (observed in Table 
2) really work through their diverging evaluation of the cost of EU-level fiscal austerity and 
coordination (i.e. our main line of argument above)? We assess this by analysing public support 
for the actions undertaken so far by the EU to deal with the crisis – using Eurobarometer 75.3 
from May 2011 (no relevant questions regarding this issue were included in the September 
2011 wave employed thus far). Eurobarometer 75.3 includes a question gauging respondents’ 
opinion towards the EU’s handling of the economic crisis: i.e. Would you say that [the 
European Union] has acted effectively to combat the crisis up till now?”. Answers go from 
“No, not at all effectively” (1) to “Yes, very effectively” (4). This admittedly does not constitute 
a direct measure of the cost of EU-level fiscal austerity and coordination. Yet, assuming that a 
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 higher evaluation of such costs will translate into lower evaluations of EU’s handling of the 
crisis, it provides a valid proxy thereof. Hence, we re-estimate equation (1) with this alternative 
dependent variable, again using a multilevel ordered logit model to deal with the specific nature 
of the dependent variable and data-structure. The results are reported in Table 3.11 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The significant interaction between GIIPSij and AGEij suggests that young people in Euro 
debtor countries are significantly less likely to support EU’s actions undertaken in the light of 
the crisis (compared to young people in Euro creditor countries). This provides suggestive 
evidence in line with the idea that the higher disapproval of direct and invasive measures of 
fiscal integration by younger citizens in Euro debtor countries (observed in Table 2) is driven 
at least in part by their higher apprehension towards the EU’s crisis-policies. Hence, the intra-
generational divide across young citizens of Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries observed 
in Table 2 indeed appears to reflect their diverging expectations regarding the costs and benefits 
of further European fiscal integration. Note that in this case we also observe a significant 
Unemployed*GIIPS interaction. Hence, there appears also to be a difference between 
unemployed individuals in Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries in the evaluation of the 
EU’s handling of the crisis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
European fiscal integration has been high on the political agenda in recent years. While often 
generating fierce debates and lengthy negotiation periods, several agreements – including the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (European Council, 2012) as well as the 
strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact (European Commission, 2011b) – have meant 
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 a steady progression towards a closer fiscal union. This article investigated how European 
citizens view such development. Our analysis highlights two central results. First, we found 
that public opinion towards European fiscal integration measures is determined both by 
individual-level and country-level variables. This confirms results in a quickly emerging 
academic literature that the debate over fiscal integration is not only a debate among countries, 
but is also characterised by a deeply divided public opinion within countries (Bechtel et al., 
2014; Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Tosun et al., 2014). 
 
Second, our analyses uncovered a substantial intra-generational divide across young citizens 
of Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries. The latter are much more hesitant than the former 
with regard to further measures of European fiscal integration (such as Eurobonds or national 
budget consultations), though they are less opposed to less invasive means of ensuring fiscal 
discipline (such as automatic penalties for fiscal irresponsibility). This divergence of young 
Europeans’ opinions appears driven in part by the asymmetric impact of the expected costs of 
EU-imposed fiscal austerity measures across countries. As citizens of Euro debtor countries 
have traditionally been pro-EU, this shift in its younger generations towards a more sceptical 
attitude may have important implications for the future of European integration. 
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NOTES
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 1  One crucial aspect thereby is the expected rating of such Eurobonds by international rating 
agencies. Assuming this rating will reflect some weighted average of the ratings of Member 
States’ national bonds, there will obviously be winners and losers. 
2  Such country-level hypotheses have likewise been brought forward in the broader literature 
analysing public support for European integration. Previous studies, for instance, show that 
citizens in countries that are net-recipients of EU cohesion policies favour European 
integration more than those in net-contributor countries (Brinegar et al., 2004). 
3 Figure 1 suggests that older residents are perceived as more strongly affected by a slightly 
larger share of respondents in Euro creditor than Euro debtor countries. This makes our 
assumption of no difference probably a conservative standpoint, as any difference would 
bias our results against the hypothesis derived here. 
4  It should be noted that this concern is at least partially mitigated by the fact that a relatively 
high share of respondents (i.e. 9% to 15%) replied “do not know” to the questions on fiscal 
integration and Eurobonds (and are thereby excluded from the analyses below). Such non-
response is substantially lower for more accessible questions in the same survey, which 
suggests that those who answered our central questions are likely to have effectively had an 
opinion. 
5  One might be concerned about the potential endogeneity of this variable. To assuage such 
fears, we repeated the analysis without it. This had no substantive effect on our main 
inferences (details upon request). 
6  We experimented with three alternatives – i.e. age as a continuous variable; in three age 
groups (<30; 30-50 and >50); in five age groups (<30; 30-40; 40-50; 50-60 and >60). These 
all indicated a clear discontinuity around the 30-years threshold, but very limited differences 
afterwards. To maintain the most parsimonious model, we use the simple below/over 30 
years indicator variable (details of alternatives available upon request). 
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 7  When investigating support for public debt-sharing at the European level, we add an 
additional control for individuals’ knowledge about Eurobonds. This is operationalized via 
an indicator variable – KNOWBONDSij – equal to 1 when a respondent has heard about 
Eurobonds (0 otherwise). 
8  Although we would have preferred to include this control also at the individual level, this 
question was unfortunately not included in the Eurobarometer survey employed here. 
9  The coefficient estimates and significance levels of the individual-level variables do not 
differ when we exclude the country-level variables (details upon request). Nevertheless, the 
addition of country-level variables substantially improves the model fit (p<0.001). 
10  Unfortunately, we do not have information about single parents, such that our empirical 
verification of H6 is necessarily restricted to young and unemployed respondents. 
11  The May 2011 wave of the Eurobarometer is less extensive in terms of the background 
characteristics asked of respondents. Hence, some of the explanatory variables included in 
Tables 1 and 2 are unavailable here. 
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 Figure 1: Individuals most affected by public-sector austerity measures 
 
Note: N=22,288. Respondents are allowed to provide maximally three answers to the question: “Who do you think 
have been affected most by public spending cuts and other austerity measures in (our country)?”. Source: 
Eurobarometer 76.2 (November 2011).  
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 Table 1: Main estimation results 
 Eurobonds National Budget 
Consultation 
Automatic 
Penalties 
Financial 
Help 
Bond approval  
 (Full knowledge) 
Bond approval  
 (Ltd knowledge) 
Individual-level variables       
H1a: ASSETS -0.123 0.136** 0.202*** 0.157** 0.113 0.194 
 (-1.28) (1.97) (3.60) (2.12) (0.71) (1.17) 
H1b: INC 0.026 0.030 0.043** 0.050*** 0.039 0.064** 
 (1.57) (1.25) (2.41) (2.88) (1.17) (2.03) 
H5: EU CORRUPT (1 if NO) 0.394*** 0.156** -0.095* 0.376*** 0.426*** 0.299*** 
 (5.03) (2.57) (-1.89) (7.35) (2.82) (2.94) 
H6: IDEO -0.095** 0.018 -0.017 -0.060* -0.113 0.047 
 (-2.62) (0.47) (-0.04) (-1.69) (-1.09) (0.39) 
H6: IDEO2 0.006 ** -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.004 
 (2.03) (-0.40) (0.46) (0.77) (0.67) (-0.40) 
Individual-level controls       
AGE (dummy under 30) 0.150** 0.035 -0.074 -0.004 -0.085 0.106 
 (2.03) (0.48) (-1.31) (-0.08) (-0.45) (0.75) 
MALE 0.021 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.091*** 0.014 0.195*** 
 (0.55) (3.12) (3.10) (2.60) (0.10) (2.94) 
MARRIED 0.099*** -0.010 0.028 -0.007 -0.049 0.076 
 (2.63) (-0.29) (0.93) (-0.20) (-0.67) (1.03) 
EDU: 16-19 Years 0.028 0.177** 0.095* 0.113 0.209 0.297*** 
 (0.50) (2.53) (1.67) (1.52) (1.47) (2.91) 
EDU: 20+ Years 0.175*** 0.231*** -0.017 0.365*** 0.349** 0.650*** 
 (2.66) (3.42) (-0.23) (3.53) (2.16) (6.15) 
EDU: ONGOING 0.413*** 0.421*** -0.056 0.381** 0.652*** 0.773*** 
 (3.79) (4.05) (-0.51) (2.45) (3.12) (3.18) 
UNEMP 0.092 -0.029 -0.043 0.059 0.156 0.804*** 
 (1.32) (-0.55) (-0.60) (0.95) (0.61) (4.06) 
SOLIDARITY 0.329*** 0.152*** 0.057** 0.471*** 0.267*** 0.197*** 
 (9.03) (4.64) (1.99) (14.59) (4.46) (2.94) 
OPTIMIST -0.159*** -0.050* 0.008 -0.296*** -0.175*** -0.265*** 
 (-5.09) (-1.78) (0.33) (-9.34) (-3.87) (-4.40) 
KNOWBONDS 0.049 - - - - - 
 (0.68)      
Country-level variables       
H2: DEBT 0.012** 0.005* -0.004 0.0005 0.008* 0.007* 
 (2.28) (1.86) (-1.13) (0.28) (1.79) (1.64) 
H2: DEFICIT 0.001 -0.013* -0.017* -0.001 0.014 -0.002 
 (0.09) (-1.80) (-1.71) (-0.20) (1.07) (-0.20) 
H2: GIIPS 0.829*** -0.358 0.021 0.515*** 0.362 0.883*** 
 (2.93) (-1.06) (0.04) (4.52) (1.11) (4.17) 
H3: SOCEXP -0.064** -0.003 0.045** 0.031*** -0.025 -0.042* 
 (-2.08) (-0.43) (3.87) (3.24) (-0.81) (-1.82) 
Country-level controls       
TRUSTEU 0.316 2.009 *** 0.755 0.487** 2.349** 1.395 
 (0.46) (12.80) (1.15) (2.19) (2.05) (1.05) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -30760.18 -17360.95 -18023.11 -20153.35 -2455.59 -2236.99 
Wald Chi2 492.29*** 1270.13*** 308.09*** 1740.06*** - - 
Countries 27 27 27 27 17 17 
N 14,083 15,280 15,522 16,323 1,990 2,161 
Random-Effects Parameters 
Country 0.543*** 0.081*** 0.552*** 0.573*** 0.192 *** 0.183 *** 
Residual 2.142 *** - - - - - 
Cut 1 - -0.862* -1.028 -0.031 -2.937*** -4.003*** 
Cut 2 - 0.522 0.462  1.282***  -0.896 -0.693 
Cut 3 - 2.953*** 2.452*** 3.53 *** 0.281 1.461 
Note: Higher values on the dependent variables correspond to higher support (for details, see main text). Coefficient estimates in 
column 1 derive from a linear multilevel model, while multilevel ordered logit models are applied in columns 2 to 6 (where 
individuals (level 1) are clustered in countries (level 2)). T-statistics based on robust standard errors reported between brackets. 
* p<0.10; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01.   
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 Table 2: Estimation results including cross-level interactions for Age and Unemployment 
 Eurobonds National Budget 
Consultation 
Automatic 
Penalties 
 
Financial 
Help 
Bond approval  
(Full knowledge) 
Bond approval  
 (Ltd knowledge) 
Age (dummy under 30) 0.202** 0.023 -0.137 * 0.070 0.250 0.195 
 (2.26) (0.31) (-1.87) (1.11) (0.82) (1.20) 
Unemployed  0.109 -0.049 -0.035 0.039 0.123 0.763*** 
 (1.27) (-0.68) (-0.47) (0.52) (0.40) (3.29) 
GIIPS 0.872*** 0.171 -0.170 0.569*** 0.422 0.970*** 
 (2.90) (-1.16) (-0.97) (5.11) (1.26) (4.23) 
Age (dummy under 30)  -0.325*** 0.022 0.285* -0.487*** -0.654** -0.332 
   * GIIPS (-2.82) (0.20) (1.82) (-3.36) (-2.13) (-1.12) 
Unemployed * GIIPS -0.047 0.067 -0.067 0.003 0.142 0.099 
 (-0.38) (0.50) (-0.44) (0.02) (0.34) (0.25) 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -30754.74 -17377.16 -18002.53 -20131.16 -2452.80 -2238.31 
Wald Chi2 871.66*** 1212.39*** 294.88*** 6786.48*** - - 
Countries 27 27 27 27 17 17 
N 14,083 15,280 15,522 16,323 1,990 2,167 
Random-Effects Parameters 
Country 0.545 *** 0.507 *** 0.418 *** 0.245 *** 0.192 *** 0.201 *** 
Residual 2.141 *** - - - - - 
Age (dummy under 30) 0.545 *** 0.032 ** 0.015 *** 0.029** 0.084** 0.047** 
Unemployed 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.031 0.065** 0.001 
Cut 1 - -1.283 *** -1.044** -0.110 -3.031 *** -4.222*** 
Cut 2 - .0100 0.454  1.207*** -0.981 -0.969 
Cut 3 - 2.568 *** 2.486*** 3.464*** 0.199 1.100 
Note: Higher values on the dependent variables correspond to higher support (for details, see main text). Coefficient estimates in 
column 1 derive from a linear multilevel model, while multilevel ordered logit models are applied in columns 2 to 6 (where 
individuals (level 1) are clustered in countries (level 2)). T-statistics based on robust standard errors reported between brackets. 
* p<0.10; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Full set of control variables included as in Table 1 (but not reported for reasons of space).  
 
Table 3: Estimation results regarding EU’s handling of the economic crisis  
 EU effective in 
economic crisis 
EU effective in 
economic crisis 
EU effective in 
economic crisis 
Age (dummy under 30) - 0.184*** 0.210*** 
  (2.59) (2.61) 
Unemployment - 0.082 0.145 
  (0.86) (1.60) 
GIIPS - -0.052 0.673*** 
  (-0.24) (5.06) 
Age (dummy under 30)*GIIPS - - -0.317** 
   (-2.09) 
Unemployed * GIIPS - - -0.406*** 
   (-2.69) 
Log pseudolikelihood -19341.72 -17493.22 -17438.36 
Wald Chi2 - 2787.34*** 4357.96*** 
Countries 27 27 27 
N 18,450 18,398 18,398 
Random-Effects Parameters 
Country 0.229 *** 1.004 *** 0.529 *** 
Age (dummy under 30) - 0.063 ** 0.042 ** 
Unemployed - 0.099 ** 0.031 ** 
Cut1 -2.647 *** -2.458 *** -2.774 *** 
Cut2 -0.134 *** 0.439 0.131 
Cut3 2.902 *** 3.808 *** 3.507 *** 
Note: The dependent variable reflects respondents’ answers on a 4-point scale from “No, not at all effectively” (1) to “Yes, 
very effectively” (4) to: “Would you say that [the European Union] has acted effectively to combat the crisis up till now?”. 
Coefficient estimates are obtained using a multilevel ordered logit model with individuals (level 1) clustered in countries 
(level 2). Robust standard errors presented between brackets. Control variables in this model include gender, marital 
status, education level, income, employment status, ideology, optimism about crisis, public debt and deficit, social 
spending, trust in EU and EU identification (full details upon request). * p<0.10; **p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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